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 Capital allocation is used for many purposes in financial institutions and for this purpose 
several methods are known. The aim of this paper is to review possible methods 
(we present six of them) and to help financial companies to choose between the methods.  
There are some properties that an allocation method should satisfy: full allocation, core 
compatibility, riskless allocation, symmetry and suitability for performance measurement 
(compatibility with Return on Risk Adjusted Capital calculation). If we think about 
practical application we should also consider simplicity of the methods. First we examine 
the methods from the point of view if they are satisfying core compatibility. We test this 
with simulation where we add to the existing literature that we test core compatibility with 
different assumptions on returns: on normal and t-distributed returns and also on returns 
generated from a copula. We find that if we measure risk by a coherent risk measure, the 
Expected Shortfall there are two methods satisfying core compatibility: the Euler method 
(that always fulfills the criteria) and cost gap method (obeys it around in about 99%).  
As Euler method is very easy to calculate even for many players while cost gap method 
becomes very complicated as the number of the players increases we examine further the 
properties of Euler method. We find that it fulfills all the above given criteria but 
symmetry and as aforementioned it is also very easy to calculate. Therefore we believe that 
the method might be suggested for practical applications. 
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A tőkeallokációt számos célra használják a pénzügyi intézményekben, melyhez különféle 
módszereket használhatnak. A tanulmány célja, hogy áttekintse a lehetséges módszereket 
(melyek közül hatot mutatunk be), valamint az, hogy megkönnyítse az egyes módszerek 
közötti választást.  
Vannak bizonyos tulajdonságok, melyek teljesítését elvárhatjuk a különféle módszerektől: 
ilyen a teljes allokáció, a kockázatmentes allokáció és a magelosztás követelménye, a 
szimmetria, valamint a teljesítménymérésben való alkalmazhatóság. Ha a módszereket a 
gyakorlatban is szeretnénk alkalmazni, akkor a fentiek mellett a számítás egyszerűségét is 
figyelembe kell vennünk.  
Először abból a szempontból vizsgáljuk a módszereket, hogy magbeli elosztást 
eredményeznek-e. Ezt szimuláció segítségével teszteljük, a korábbi irodalmakhoz képest 
annyiban lépve tovább, hogy különböző feltételezésekkel élünk a hozamokra vonatkozóan: 
normális eloszlás, t-eloszlás és kopula segítségével generált hozamokat is vizsgálunk. Két 
olyan módszert találunk, melyek a szimuláció során közel 100%-ban magallokációt 
eredményeznek: a cost gap módszert és az Euler-módszert (amely minden esetben magbeli 
elosztást ad).  
Mivel azonban a kettő közül az Euler-módszerrel való számítás jelentősen egyszerűbb, a 
továbbiakban az Euler-módszer tulajdonságait vizsgáljuk, melynek során azt találjuk, hogy 
a szimmetrián kívül minden kritériumnak eleget tesz. Ez alapján úgy gondoljuk, hogy ez a 
módszer javasolható lenne a gyakorlati alkalmazásokban való felhasználásra.  
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Capital  allocation  is  used  for  many  purposes  in  financial  institutions  and  for  this  purpose 
several methods are known. The aim of this paper is to review possible methods (we present 
six of them) and to help financial companies to choose between the methods.   
There  are  some  properties  that  an  allocation  method  should  satisfy:  full  allocation,  core 
compatibility,  riskless  allocation,  symmetry  and  suitability  for  performance  measurement 
(compatibility with Return on Risk Adjusted Capital calculation). If we think about practical 
application we should also consider simplicity of the methods.  
First we examine the methods from the point of view if they are satisfying core compatibility. 
We  test  this  with  simulation  where  we  add  to  the  existing  literature  that  we  test  core 
compatibility with different assumptions on returns: on normal and t-distributed returns and 
also on returns generated from a copula. We find that if we measure risk by a coherent risk 
measure, the Expected Shortfall there are two methods satisfying core compatibility: the Euler 
method (that always fulfills the criteria) and cost gap method (obeys it around in about 99%).  
As  Euler  method  is  very  easy  to  calculate  even  for  many  players  while  cost  gap  method 
becomes  very  complicated  as  the  number  of  the  players  increases  we  examine  further  the 
properties of Euler method. We find that it fulfills all the above given criteria but symmetry 
and as aforementioned it is also very easy to calculate. Therefore we believe that the method 
might be suggested for practical applications.    
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1  Introduction 
Capital allocation means the process of distributing the capital to different business lines or 
portfolio elements. As financial markets are getting more and more rigorously regulated the 
importance of capital allocation is also increasing. In the article we are going to analyze six 
possible  allocation  methods  and  try  to  find  out  if  there  is  any  of  them  that  both  results 
allocation satisfying some reasonable requirements and also easy to employ – so it can be 
suggested for practical purposes. As both Hungarian and international studies are showing 
that capital allocation is not yet a very common practice at financial institutions, finding such 
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a method might be a real benefit. We will show that if we use Expected Shortfall as risk 
measure Euler method has many desirable properties as it fulfills the requirements of full 
allocation,  core  compatibility,  riskless  allocation  and  it  is  suitable  for  performance 
measurement (see Denault, 2001 and Tasche, 2008). Furthermore it is really easy to calculate 
independently  from  the  number  of  considered  business  lines.  The  paper  is  organized  as 
follows: in the next Section we present application areas of capital allocation to emphasize 
how important this process is at financial enterprises. In Section 3 we review the properties 
that an allocation method should satisfy and give six possible methods in Section 4. In Section 
5  we  examine  using  simulation  the  fulfillment  of  core  compatibility  first  in  portfolios 
consisting  of  three  elements.  We  test  this  with  different  assumptions:  on  normal  and  t-
distributed  returns  and  also  on  returns  generated  from  a  copula.  We  also  examine  what 
happens  if  we  increase  the  number  of  players  and  run  the  simulation  for  normal  and  t-
distributed returns with four players too. The simulation shows that best results belong to the 
Euler and cost gap methods. As cost gap method gets very complicated to calculate with 
larger number of divisions, we examine further properties of Euler method in Section 6. In the 
last Section we summarize our results.     
2  Motivation 
The allocation of capital is a process that is applied by most of the financial institutions in 
their operation.  We summarize the most important application areas to present why we think 
that the comparison of the methods detailed in Section 3 might be useful in practice too.  
The most obvious application is allocation of capital among different lines of business in 
banks or other financial institutions. As capital means cost for the banks (as it must be held in 
risk free assets, generating no or very low interest) it is important to know the contribution of 
the different lines of business to this cost. Most common targets of the allocation are the 
following divisions: retail, corporate and investment banking, leasing, treasury etc.  
Capital allocation is used in performance measurement too. When someone wants to compare 
revenue earned by different business lines it is also necessary to take their capital needs into 
account. The most widely applied indicators are Return on Risk Adjusted Capital (RORAC), 
Risk  Adjusted  Return  on  Capital  (RAROC)  and  Risk  Adjusted  Return  or  Risk  Adjusted 
Capital (RARORAC). For the exact definition of RORAC see Section 3.  3 
 
It  is  also  possible  to  allocate  capital  among  individuals  or  products  instead  of  lines  of 
business. This way capital allocation might be used for individual performance measurement 
in case of managers and also to define limits in case of traders. If we talk about managers then 
the same indicators can be used as for measuring performance of lines of business. This is 
usually done in order to decide on their bonuses or just to evaluate them. In case of traders 
limits can be set up using capital allocation methods to limit the exposure of trading in the 
treasury. Limits can also be set for portfolios instead of traders.  
Another application area is in strategic decision making process. The methods we present here 
can also be used when a bank wants to extend its activity with a new business line. In this 
situation  revenues  and  capital  need  must  be  forecasted  and  performance  measurement 
indicators should be calculated but it also has to be considered how the new business line will 
affect the capital need of the existing ones. When we think about products instead of new 
divisions the same process can be used for pricing new products.      
We also should not forget insurance companies as capital allocation is also an important tool 
there. In this case it is also applied for defining capital needs of different business lines (life, 
non-life etc.), but it might be useful too when more insurers underwrite a risk together that 
would be too large for any of them alone. In this case premium and risk sharing can also be 
done via methods described in this paper.  
Regarding the question to what extent are these methods used in practice we are aware of only 
two papers, one of them regarding Hungarian, the other German banks. Balogh (2006) has 
found  that  capital  allocation  is  rather  only  performed  on  regulatory  basis  (i.e.  regulatory 
capital requirement is calculated for each lines of business and these are aggregated than) and 
risk based capital allocation is not a common tool in Hungary. According to Homburg and 
Scherpereel (2005) the situation was better in Germany as the same was true for only 56% of 
the German banks. But 17% used incremental method, 11% the beta method, and 16% other 
methods to allocate risk capital. We assume that this situation has improved in the years 
passed since these studies were written and therefore we think that our paper can really have 
benefits in practice.        4 
 
3  The allocation of capital 
To discuss the allocation methods first we have to define what capital is. In our approach 
capital will be considered as economic capital. Let us suppose a financial institution has n 
divisions and let   denote the set of divisions, and let   be random 
variables,  standing  for  the  profits  on  the  assets  in  a  division.  This  way  the  company  is 
represented by a vector   and let   denote the aggregated profit. 
Economic capital means the reserve that a financial company needs to cover its losses and it is 
determined by a risk measure denoted by  :  
 
According to Artzner et al. [1999] a risk measure   is coherent if it satisfies the following 
properties:  
  Subadditivity:  . 
  Monotonicity: if   then  . 
  Positive homogeneity: for all  we have  . 
  Translation invariance: for all    we have that  . 
For further reading on coherent measures of risk we suggest Csóka et al. [2007]. The most 
common risk measure is Value at Risk (VaR). Given the significance level α it is calculated 
as: 
 
Even though VaR is very popular it is not a coherent measure of risk, as it is well known that 
it violates the criterion of subadditivity. Therefore we are going to use another risk measure, 
Expected Shortfall (from now on ES):  
,  
where      stands  for  the  generalized  inverse  function.  Given  the 
significance level (1-α) ES results the average loss in α% of the worst cases (while VaR 
shows the best outcome among them).  Apart from the fact that coherent risk measures (be 
definition)  satisfy  the  four  criteria  given  above  it  has  another  one  desirable  property  to 
measure risk with them, as it was shown by Denault [2001] that there always exists a core 
compatible allocation if we use a coherent risk measure. Furthermore Csóka et al. [2009] 5 
 
proved that the class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of totally balanced 
games, that is all risk allocation games are totally balanced and all totally balanced games can 
be generated by a risk allocation game with a properly specified risk environment.  
As we already defined capital we can move on to its allocation. It seems quite natural to 
consider capital allocation as a cost sharing game well know from cooperative game theory. 
There are several examples in the literature, for example Csóka and Pintér [2011]. This way 
we look at capital as a total cost, that has to be shared between the players, the divisions.  
Now  we  can  say  that  an  allocation  rule  is  a  function  that  assigns  the  vector 
)  to  the  portfolios  of  the  divisions  where  the   
element  of  the  vector  denotes  the  capital  allocated  to  ith  division,  given  a  specific  risk 
measure,  . Similarly to the coherent properties of a risk measure there are some requirements 
that an allocation rule should satisfy (following Denault, 2001 and Tasche, 2008). 
  Full allocation:    
  Core compatibility: for all subsets we have    
  Symmetry: If by joining any subset  , portfolios i and j both make the 
same contribution to the risk capital, then    
  Riskless allocation:   
  RORAC-compatibility: let us define the RORAC (Return On Risk Adjusted Capital) of 
the ith division by:   
where   denotes the expected return on division i. The risk contributions   are 
RORAC-compatible if there exists some ε > 0 so that   
 
for  all  0  <  h  <  ε.  A  capital  allocation  rule  is  RORAC-compatible  if  all  the  risk 
contributions,   fulfill the above given criterion.   
    
The  interpretation  of  the  axioms  is  as  follows.  Full  allocation  represents  the  natural 
requirement that the sum of the allocated capitals of the divisions must be equal to the risk of 
the main unit. Core compatibility means that a portfolio should not have any subset that is 
allocated  more  capital  than  the  risk  capital  it would  face  as  a  separate  entity.  Symmetry 
ensures that the capital allocated to the elements should only depend on its contribution to the 
risk of the portfolio and nothing else. The meaning of the riskless allocation axiom is also 6 
 
clear:  to  a  riskless  portfolio  its  risk  measure  should  be  allocated.  RORAC-compatibility 
becomes  relevant  if  we  would  like  to  use  the  result  of  the  allocation  in  performance 
measurement. It says that if we add a new element to the portfolio having a higher RORAC 
(better performance) then the new portfolio’s RORAC also has to increase (should perform 
better).  An  allocation  rule  satisfying  core  compatibility,  symmetry  and  riskless  allocation 
principles is often referred as coherent (Denault, 2001). 
4  Capital allocation methods 
Let us  overview  some  of the most common capital  allocation methods.  We are  going  to 
present these methods without the specification of the risk measure so they can be easily 
applied with other kinds of risk measures, not only ES that we are going to use for risk 
measurement.  When  we  introduce  the  first  five  methods  we  will  follow  the  article  of 
Homburg  and  Scherpereel  [2008]  and  on  the  top  of  that  we  will  also  analyze  the  Euler 
method. We only take into account allocation rules that satisfy full allocation property. 
4.1  Activity based method 
Activity based method is a long known and popular allocation scheme (see e.g. Hamlen et al., 
1977) that allocates the joint capital to the portfolio elements in proportion to their own risk: 
 
A really serious drawback of the method is that it does not consider the dependence structure 
between the portfolio elements.  This means it does not ‘reward’ those elements with smaller 
units of risk allocated that are correlated negatively with the rest of the portfolio. 
4.2  Beta method    
Beta method – also known as covariance-based allocation – is discussed for example at Panjer 
[2002]. Let   denote the covariance of the portfolio X and the ith division. As we 
know  the  beta  of  the  ith  division  can  be  calculated  as  .  This  way  the  risk 
allocated to   is:  7 
 
 
If we consider a financial institution and we would like to allocate its risk to its divisions we 
can assume that the weight of each division is one. In this case the sum of the betas equals 




4.3  Incremental method  
For further reading on the method we suggest Jorion [2007]. Let us define the increment 
caused by a division given the coalition S as   for all 
coalitions  and for all   where   Now we can define the allocated capital 
similarly to the activity based method:  
 
 
where the second definition is only necessary to enable us for easier comparison with the cost 
gap method.  
4.4  Cost gap method 
After a smaller amendment on the above given method we get the cost gap allocation rule, 
first introduced by Tijs and Driessen [1986]:  
           (5) 
 where  . This means that if the sum of 
the increments equals the whole risk of the portfolio then we already have the allocation. 8 
 
Otherwise by both methods there’s a correction factor that guarantees that the full allocation 
principle  is  fulfilled  and  the  difference  between  the  two  methods  is  only  the  way  of 
correction.  However – as we will see – this apparently small modification makes one much 
better in core allocation percentage than the other.      
4.5   Shapley method  
The Shapley method is a well-known tool in cost allocation games with a number of favorable 
properties  (for  example  it  always  results  core  allocation  in  case  of  convex  games).  
Nevertheless a serious drawback of the method is that it can be calculated easily when we 
have only a few players but with more calculation becomes fairly complicated (this holds for 
the incremental and cost gap methods too). Shapley [1953] investigated if there exists a value 
that represents the utility that is caused for the player by taking part in the game. The rule 
calculates the cost by the weighted average of cost increments caused by the given division 
(we still use the same definition of increments given above):  
 
for all i=1, …, n, where   denotes the number of divisions in coalition S.  
4.6  Euler- (or gradient) method 
Euler (or gradient) method is a very old allocation scheme known in game theory as Aumann-
Shapley value (see Aumann and Shapley, 1974). Throughout the discussion we are going to 
use the following notations. First let us calculate the value of a portfolio by the sum product 
of the value of its elements and their weights:  . Let 
 be positively homogenous (that does not mean any restriction as we only 
concern coherent risk measures). The per unit allocated risk is given by:  
 
assuming that   is continuously differentiable.   




so – getting back to our former notation – the following holds:  
 
The differentiability of the risk measure Expected Shortfall is discussed by Tasche [2000]. 
According to his results the derivative – if exists – can be calculated as: 
 
5  Examination of the different allocation methods – core compatibility 
When it comes to practical application it is important to know the properties of the above 
presented methods in order to choose between them. In this section we are going to examine 
the methods from the point of view if they are core compatible and if not to what extent 
(probability) they obey the criterion. We believe that core compatibility is the most important 
property of an allocation rule as it captures fairness of the allocation. It is also confirmed by 
the survey of Homburg and Scherpereel [2005] where fairness was evaluated to be a very 
momentous criterion.  
Our aim was to perform a study similar to Homburg’s and Scherpereel’s [2008] but we made 
some  modifications  as  follows.  We  also  performed  simulations  but  we  used  ES  as  risk 
measure  while  they  chose  VaR,  because  as  we  mentioned  earlier  VaR  is  not  a  coherent 
measure of risk contrary to ES. The second significant difference was that we used historic 
method  counter  to  the  authors  who  applied  delta-normal  method.  This  means  that  we 
generated sample return data and calculated ES from these ‘time series’ while Homburg and 
Scherpereel  generated  only  covariance  matrices  to  calculate  VaR.    This  way  they  only 
considered normally distributed returns, while we also generated returns from t-distribution 
and from a copula. We also added Euler method that the authors did not consider in their 
article.  
During the simulation we assumed to have a portfolio (bank) consisting of for first three, then 
four  elements  (divisions)  and  used  two  different  approaches  in  the  simulation.  First  we 
generated return time series using random correlation matrices. As the most simple case of the 
first approach we used normal distribution, but we also ran the simulation with Student t-10 
 
distribution. T-distribution describes the behavior of real returns better as they are well known 
to  be heavy tailed, observed first  by Mandelbrot  back in  1963. We generated correlation 
matrices (more precisely, first Cholesky matrices) and the standard deviation of each asset, 
that was chosen randomly from U(0,1). We also created the random independent return time 
series from normal and t-distribution. We used t-distribution with 5 degrees of freedom, that 
means pretty fat tails, similarly to that we can observe in real asset returns. This way we got 
multivariate  normal  and  t-distributed  time  series.  At  this  stage  we  could  calculate  the 
allocated  capital  applying  the  methods  discussed  above.  Finally  we  examined  if  the 
allocations resulted from the different rules were core compatible or not: we calculated the 
allocated risk of every possible coalitions and the single assets and examined if there was a 
coalition (or single element) that was allocated higher risk than it had on a stand-alone basis. 
We generated 5000 correlation  matrices (considering both running time and the stability of 
the result) and to all of them random time series of 500 elements (that means two years data if 
we assume to have 250 trading days a year).   
As a second approach we generated return time series from a copula. Because of the presence 
of simultaneous extreme returns in real life copulas should be even better in modeling the 
returns of financial assets. We chose Clayton-copula for this purpose as it assumes lower tail 
dependence and that is what we normally observe on financial markets. The problem we faced 
was that using Clayton-copula we could only generate positively correlated variables.  So we 
modified this method by multiplying all simulated time series by randomly plus or minus one 
(we will denote this by Clayton-copula II later). This way we could handle the problem of 
positive correlation but meanwhile we lost the property that it results higher correlation in 
periods of turmoil. Even though if for example we look at what has happened when the crisis 
reached  Hungary  we  could  observe  that  equity  and  currency  exchange  rates  were  falling 
dramatically at the same. Considering a portfolio consisting of Hungarian equities and foreign 
currency  the  value  of  the  former  was  steeply  decreasing  while  the  other  remarkably 
appreciated. Because of the unfavorable results that we got from the simulation with copulas 
(detailed later in this Section) we only ran this type of simulation for three players.  
Of course, in both cases we wanted to know how many percent of the examined cases resulted 
core compatible allocation.  The closer is the ratio of core compatible outcomes to one the 
better the method is, naturally.   
First of all let us present a graph that shows how different methods allocate risk to make the 
purpose of the simulation clearer (Graph 1). In the case illustrated on the Graph we had three 11 
 
players (divisions). It is generated from t-distribution, applying 99% significance level and the 
following (arbitrarily chosen) correlation coefficients:  , and 
standard deviation   for all the three assets.  
 
Graph 1: Comparison of the allocations resulted by different methods 
In this case Euler- and cost gap methods resulted core compatible allocations but not the 
others (the graph shows that the risk of the grand coalition is the same for all cases as it was 
computed uniformly with ES). The condition of core compatibility was violated by asset 2 in 
case of the incremental method,  by the coalition consisting of asset 1 and 3 in case of Shapley 
and activity based method and by coalition consisting of asset 1 and 2 in case of beta method. 
On the graph this can be observed from the fact that the red column (that shows the stand-
alone risk of the asset or coalition) is shorter than the column belonging to a specific method. 
The graph also shows that in our example Euler and cost gap methods are allocating the risk 
quite similarly (they both result the same order respect to the value of the allocated capital, 
but form the remaining four methods only one, the Shapley-method results the same order). 
This will be in line with our results. So let us now move to them. 
We illustrate the results of our simulations for three players in Table 1. As we mentioned 
earlier, the closer the ratio of core compatible outcomes is to one the better the method is.  We 
ran every simulation using three different significance levels (84.13%, 95% and 99%) but as 
we could not observe a remarkable difference we will only give the results for 99% here. The 





















comparison of the results. They used α=84.13% confidence level but as aforementioned it did 
not mean problem as ratios did not significantly change when we chose another significance 
level. 
 
Table 1: The ratio of core-compatible allocations with three players 
As the table shows we found that cost gap and Euler methods were much better than the 
others when we employed ES as risk measure. In most cases incremental and activity based 
methods showed relatively poor performance. The Shapley and the beta methods performed 
better than the former two that means they obeyed the criterion of core compatibility around 
60% of the cases. We believe that this is still too weak performance for practical application.    
We also would like to draw attention briefly to the fact the when we used Clayton copula (I) 
the results were significantly different from normal or t-distribution: even the worst result was 
more than 83%. This shows us how dangerous it is to use copulas in modeling.  The reason of 
this is that during risk estimation we concentrated only on the lower tail of the distribution 
and that is where the correlation coefficient is very close to 1. This is why we also needed the 
Clayton copula II denoted running (where we multiplied the time series randomly by 1 and -
1). Therefore we did not run the simulation with copulas for four players.  
The results of the simulation with four players are presented in Table 2. Here we also added 
the results of Homburg and Scherpereel [2008].  
 
 
Table 2: The ratio of core-compatible allocations with four players 
α=99% Beta method Cost gap Shapley Activity based Incremental Euler
Homburg&Scherpereel 
(α=84,13%)
100% 100% 90,1% 66,1% 48,2% -
Normal distribution 61.4% 99.1% 67.2% 40.7% 22.2% 100,0%
Student-t distribution 52.4% 97.8% 63.6% 40.3% 22.4% 100,0%
Clayton copula I.  83,3% 100,0% 99,6% 95,3% 96,4% 100,0%
Clayton copula II.  76,2% 99,3% 89,3% 70,8% 51,4% 100,0%
α=99% Beta method Cost gap Shapley Activity based Incremental Euler
Homburg&Scherpereel 
(α=84,13%)
100% 99.9% 85.4% 50.1% 34.8% -
Normal distribution 47,6% 96,7% 44,9% 17,5% 8,1% 100,0%
Student-t distribution 37,9% 94,7% 44,8% 18,7% 7,3% 100,0%13 
 
Comparing the ratios of core compatible allocations with four players to the result we got with 
three players we can generally say that the ratio of core compatible allocations is decreasing 
as we increase the number of players. The only exception is Euler method that still satisfies 
the  criteria  in  all  cases.  Cost  gap  method  also  still  performs  well.  Its  results  have  only 
worsened  slightly  (around  3%)  compared  to  the  other  methods’  performances  that  have 
decreased by at least 14%. The results of the simulation with four players outline the fact the 
Euler method and cost gap method are the only possible candidates for capital allocation if we 
would like to get core compatible allocations.   
6  Further properties of the Euler method 
The simulation showed that the best performing methods were cost gap and Euler method. 
Nevertheless between these two methods  a big difference can be observed if we also consider 
how easy is the application of a method – that is also a very important practical standpoint. 
No doubt that from this point of view Euler method is the better one, as it can be calculated by 
the average return of the assets in the α% of the worst cases (regarding the grand coalition). 
This can be done easily even if we have a large number of portfolio elements. However if we 
choose cost gap method the increments and the   correction factors can be easily calculated 
as  long  as  we  consider  three  or  four  assets  but  it  becomes  very  complicated  and  time-
consuming when we want to count it in case of more assets.  
On this basis Euler method seems a hopeful candidate for practical application. In this section 
we will have a look at its other properties to decide if it indeed can be suggested for that 
purpose. First of all Buch and Dorfleitner [2008] showed that – using gradient method for 
capital allocation – there are links connecting the axioms of coherent measures of risk and 
capital allocation rules:  
 
  subadditivity of the risk measure implies core compatibility of the allocation (that is 
confirmed by our simulation) and 
  translation invariance of the risk measure implies the fulfillment of riskless allocation. 
As Expected Shortfall is a coherent measure of risk the capital allocation resulted by ES based 
Euler  method  also  satisfies  the  axiom  of  riskless  allocation.  Nevertheless  it  is  shown  by 
Tasche [2008] that this is the only RORAC-compatible capital allocation method.   14 
 
Regarding symmetry, the only criterion left, Buch and Dorfleitner [2008] showed that if we 
use the gradient allocation principle symmetry property implies linearity of the underlying 
risk measure,  that do not allow for diversification effects. As ES is not linear, symmetry is 
the only criterion that is not fulfilled by the Euler method on ES basis. To illustrate the 
situation where the Euler method is not symmetric let us consider the following situation. We 
only have four possible states of nature (just for simplicity) and three players. The first three 
columns of the Table 3 contain the payoffs of the players in the different states of nature. In 
the following columns these are added to calculate payoffs of the coalitions consisting of two 
players and the large coalition. As we only have four states of nature, ES calculated on any 
significance level higher than 75% coincides with the maximum loss.      
 
Table 3: The example for Euler method being not symmetric 
In this situation players 1 and 2 are symmetric as they add the same risk to the empty coalition 
(10) and to player 3 also (5). However if we allocate the risk of the grand coalition (107) 
Euler method allocates 3 units on player 1 and 4 units on player 2, so the allocation does not 
fulfill the criterion of symmetry.  
7  Summary 
The subject of the paper was to find out if there is any capital allocation method that results 
optimal allocation from every point of view that means it both satisfies the axioms of full 
allocation, core compatibility, symmetry, riskless allocation and it is also simple enough to be 
used in real life. We presented six different methods and examined using simulation if they 
satisfy core compatibility  when we consider portfolios  consisting of first  three, then  four 
elements. We found that Euler and cost gap method obey core compatibility in nearly 100% 
of the cases, but when we compare them we see that Euler method is much easier to employ 
as calculation of cost gap method becomes extremely difficult when we have many divisions. 
{1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
1st state of 
nature
-10 -10 0 -10 -10 -10 -20
2nd state of 
nature
-3 -4 -100 -103 -103 -104 -107
3rd state of 
nature
-6 0 -99 -105 -105 -99 -105
4th state of 
nature
0 -6 -99 -99 -99 -105 -105
ES (or ML) 10 10 100 105 105 105 10715 
 
Therefore  we  investigated  further  properties  of  our  only  left  candidate,  Euler  method. 
Summarizing its properties we can say that:   
  ES is a coherent measure of risk i.e. it is subadditive, monotone, positive homogenous 
and translation invariant; 
  the allocation is core compatible, 
  satisfies the riskless allocation axiom; 
   it is the only method suitable for performance measurement (RORAC-compatible);  
  and it is easy to apply even if we have an arbitrary large number of divisions and 
  therefore has all the desirable properties but symmetry.  
As we found that Euler method does not satisfy the symmetry property the answer to our 
question is negative, as none of the methods fulfill all the five examined criteria. Even though 
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